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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GAYLAND, a Utah ·Corporation, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH: LAMONT B. GUNDER-
SON, EDWIN Q. CANNON, SR., 
and WILLIAM G. LARSON, Indi-
vidually and as members of the 
Board of County ·Commissioners of 
Salt Lake County, 
Appellants. 
Case No. 
9280 
BRIEF OF INTERVENERS 
D. HOWE MOFFATT 
ROBERT R. DANSIE 
PAUL POTTER 
JAMES P. ·COWLEY 
\V. ARWICK C. LAMOREAUX 
Attorneys for Interveners 
STATEMENT OF THE ·CASE 
This matter is before the court on appeal by Salt 
Lake County from a judgment by the lower court revers-
ing the determination of a zoning question by the Board 
of County Commissioners. 
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These interveners were requested by this court to 
file a memorandum, at the time of the argument. We 
desire this court to remand the matter to the trial court 
so that the issues may be tried out fully, with all neces-
sary parties before the court. On the other hand, if this 
court chooses not to so remand, then the judgment of the 
lower court should be reversed. 
The interveners are the parties who appeared before 
the County Commissioners and made a record at the 
hearing against the issue of rezoning residential prop-
erty, but were not advised of the lower court's review 
of the matters heard and determined in the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF THE F A·CTS 
Gayland applied for a change of zoning on a tract 
at 56th South at 13th East in Salt Lake County from 
residential to commercial. The District Planning Com. 
mission had opposed said application. The Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission, after Gayland reduced 
the size of the tract from 80 acres to 18, and then to 10 
acres, recommended the change. (Ex. 1) As required 
by the statute, the attempt by Gayland to amend the 
district maps was at the legislative and administrative 
discretion of the Board of County Commissioners; (17-
27-14 UCA 1953) and pursuant to law and notice, a public 
hearing was had on November 4, 1959 at which fourteen 
persons made statements opposing the proposal to amend. 
An equal number appeared in favor. The transcript, 
exhibit 3, is the record of proceedings. A large number 
of maps and exhibits were introduced and used at the 
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hearing, but for reasons not known to interveners, not 
one of these maps was before the lower court, and is not 
before this court for review. 
Mr. Brockbank, president of Gayland-applicant, 
n1ade a statement showing the general character of the 
area as being residential, and under considerable develop-
ment. (Tr. 6) He reviewed the traffic patterns manifest 
by the maps showing the principal arterial highways 
existent and projected on which there was no controversy. 
He stated there were no shopping facilities in the area 
and stated his desire to have the privilege of building 
same at the above stated location, stating it was strategic. 
He and others stated that 13th East was to be an "ex-
press-way", intended by the county, state road commis-
sion and other authorities to move traffic rapidly in and 
out of the city and beyond the south boundaries of the 
county. (Tr. 8, 10) He did not say how the commercial 
facility he hoped to build would avoid traffic congestion 
and a slowing down of automotive movement on that 
important junction. l\lost of the witnesses against the 
change made specific reference to those dangers and 
pointed out that the overall importance of the express-
way would be jeopardized and nullified if the historic 
policy of the county were changed, and commercial 
facilities allowed to come onto 13th East. The express-
way planning had precluded any extension of commercial 
zoning thereon. A witness said: "For these reasons, 
you gentlemen have shown excellent judgment over the 
years gone by in designating Thirteenth East as a no-
access traffic-carrying artery." (Tr. 32) Other com-
petent witnesses referred to the folly of allowing com-
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mercial development along 13th East to defeat the long-
planned purpose to move traffic rapidly there-along. 
(Tr. 39, 45, 60) 
It was disclosed by many witnesses that there al-
ready existed many separate tracts of commercially-
zoned land in the general area, aggregating in excess of 
167 acres. (36, 42, 45, 47, 52, 56, 60, 63, 64, 67) The 
opponents of the proposed change showed these areas 
on the maps, now absent in the record, undertaking to 
show the commission that there was excess commercial 
zoning already existent. Pertinent to this important 
question, a witness said: (Tr. 52) 
"In the Murray area alone right now there 
is considerable zoned property that is not being 
used because the population has not grown suffi-
ciently to develop that. It now stands as a blighted 
area. People do not wish to build homes in the 
zoned area and the business will not justify all 
of the area at the present time being built upon." 
An issue developed at the hearing as to the serious-
ness of intentions of the owners of the existing c.ommer-
cially zoned land to proceed, to build shopping facilities 
to serve the people of the area. Counsel for Gayland 
chided: "What good will one hundred sixty acres or two 
thousand zoned commercially do the people that want 
to shop if there is nothing on there' I think it is mate-
rial when these things are going up. They come in and 
say that they have all this land zoned. What good is it 
if there is nothing on it? ... " To which the chairman 
responded: "I think it is material." (Tr. 69) 
4: 
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The witnesses had developed that one of the reasons 
immediate development had lagged was that tenants, 
commercially intending service units, were terrified, 
frightened "with the confusion and· the zoning that comes 
up, that is perpetually coming up." (Tr. 43, 44, 34, 35) 
It was not the owners of the lands, but the potential 
tenants, the grocers, druggists, clothiers, that were and 
are still, uncertain. All of the land owners, including 
the applicant, were and are in competition, unable to 
make plans and commitments to service units that have 
wanted to come into the central-county area. The record 
makes it plain that the real problem was not the owners 
of the lands, but the potential tenants, the service units 
that were and are hoping for some "stability" of zoning 
so that they may make decisions. As we will later 
develop in our argument, this represented the central 
problem, not the landowners. And the question before 
the county commission for decision was whether to grant 
additional commercial zoning before the existent tracts 
went into development. 
In a lively discussion between Gayland's counsel, 
and the representative of extensive lands three-and-a-
half blocks to the west owned by Hi-Land Dairyman's 
Association, it 'vas said: "I would like to say if Mr. 
Rampton- had he asked Hi-Land if we will be building 
next year, Hi-Land will do and build; we will so do. 
We are going to build a very, very large shopping cen-
ter." (Tr. 71) A current view of the tracts at 9th East 
at 5600 South will show the honesty of these words. 
Hi-Land is going ahead as planned, as are the Howe 
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Brothers. But a real problem of "Stability" of zoning 
existed, and still does. 
The county commissioners by a two-to-one vote re-
jected the application, giving as reasons, as shown on 
exhibit "1": 
"There is sufficient commercial zoning in the 
area; not warranted at this time." 
That cleared the air. 
Immediately following this decision, Gayland entered 
the court asking alternative relief: that the entire zoning 
ordinance of the county be declared void, or that the 
court rezone the Gay land area. (R. 5) No notice 
appeared to advise these vocal and interested oppon-
ents, whose identity and interest was well known to Gay-
land "on the record." Not one of them was made a party 
to the serious but secret contest that followed. 
The county defaulted. A belated attempt was made 
to create the semblance of an issue for the lower court, 
but the record before us, together with what follows 
in this brief, will disclose that the interests of the public 
were not preserved in this important area of determina-
tion. It was but five days before the petition for inter-
vention was filed that any of the interveners learned of 
the lower court action, and the imminence of argument 
before this court. The only way interveners came to 
lmowledge then was a publicized hearing on two addi-
tional applications for extension of commercial zoning 
on 13th East just four blocks south of the Gayland 
property. The interveners, intent on showing diligence 
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in the protection of their lawful interests in respect to 
the 62nd South applications, learned then that quietly, 
and without notice, the 56th South denial by the county 
Commission had been overturned. These interveners 
acted immediately to enter this appeal. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law enter-
ed in the court below, not being predicated on evidence, 
and contrary to the evidence and of law, require, compel 
correction. Hence the application of these interveners, 
who not alone demand a right to be heard on their own 
account, but for the benefit of the public. 
POINT 
I. THE INTERVENERS HAVE A CLEAR RIGHT 
TO INTERVENE. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE INTERVENERS HAVE A CLEAR RIGHT 
TO INTERVENE. 
The status of interveners in this case is governed 
by Rule 24 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, under the 
following sub-sections : 
(A) INTERVENTION OF RIGHT. Upon 
timely application anyone shall be permitted to 
intervene in an action: 
(1) when a statute confers an unconditional 
right to intervene; or 
(2) when the representation of the appli-
cant's interest by existing parties is or may be 
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inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound 
by a judgment in the action; or 
(3) when the applicant is so situated as to 
be adversely affected by a distribution or other 
disposition of property which is in the custody 
or subject to the control or disposition of the 
court or an officer thereof. 
The interveners are clearly within all of the above 
conditions. We shall discuss these conditions in relation 
with intervener's position, in the order of the rule. 
(A) TIMELY APPLICATION: 
In our Petition for Intervention, filed with this court 
on the 8th day of December, 1960, it is stated: 
"3. That the above-entitled action was com-
menced and went to judgment in the District 
Court without any of the parties hereto being 
made parties to said action, or being given any 
notice whatsoever of the commencement or pen-
dency of said action, and the parties hereto have, 
within the past week, first learned of the above-
entitled action." 
Interveners acted promptly, and in less than a week 
after learning of the above action, the application and 
petition to intervene was served and filed. In the case 
of Leary v. United States, 224 U.S. 567; 32 Sup. Ct. 599, 
it was declared by Justice Holmes that there is no pre-
sumption that a citizen has knowledge of a pending 
action. The record is devoid of any evidence or shred 
thereof that these interveners had any knowledge of 
these proceedings thereof. That should dispose of the 
question of timely application. 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(B) THE STATUTES OF UTAH CONFER 
TWO UNCONDITIONAL RIGHTS TO INTERVENE: 
This action was brought by plaintiff below under 
the Declaratory Judgments Act, 78-33-1 et sec. The cause 
of action not only sounds in declaratory relief, (R. 5, 
Resp. Br. 3) but respondent Gayland, unsatisfied with 
the result below on the alternative grounds, comes before 
this court on "cross-appeal" from the refusal of the 
court below to "declare the zoning resolutions invalid." 
(Respondent's brief, p. 4, middle). 
The Declaratory Judgments Act states in section 2 
thereof that ''any person interested ... may have deter-
mined any question of construction or validity arising 
under the ... statute, ordinance ... and obtain a declara-
tion of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder." 
78-33-2 
In 78-33-11, the parties required to be brought before 
the court are stated: 
''When declaratory relief is sought all per-
sons shall be made parties who have or claim any 
interest which would be affected by the declara-
tion, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights 
of persons not parties to the proceedings .... " 
Respondent cannot say that it was unaware of the 
existence of these interveners and their vital interests. 
Each and every one of them was present in person or 
by counsel, at the public hearing before the Board of 
County Commissioners, and gave his name, and in most 
cases, hls address. Exhibit 3 is the brown transcript of 
the said hearing, referred to and admitted on page 17 
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of the record here and consists of 73 pages of testimony. 
It is not numbered as an exhibit. On pages 2 and 3 of 
said exhibit three the names of all of the interveners 
appear in the index. Their respective statements appear. 
It is assumed that plaintiff had the matter reported as 
the commission does not ordinarily do such. 
The basis of the vice of the plaintiff or the court 
in failing to notify or join these interveners in the court 
proceedings below may be found on page 1 of exhibit 3 
wherein the schedule of "appearances" includes only 
the name of the county planning director, and counsel 
for the plaintiff, along with the names of the county 
commissioners. Good reporting procedures would at 
least include the names of counsel who formally appear-
ed. These would include Grant Macfarlane and Warwick 
C. Lamoreaux, both of whom spoke for parties in inter-
est; and counsel for plaintiff-respondent was well aware 
of their presence, as may be seen from their colloquy. 
(Tr. 69, 71) Sufficient to repeat, none of the 14 parties 
appearing agamst the applicant before the county com-
mission were noticed nor joined as parties. 78-33-11 
unequivocably says these parties "shall" be made parties. 
Thus above appears the first of two statutory "un-
conditional rights to intervene" as required by Rule 24. 
The second such unconditional right to intervene 
is set forth in 17-27-23 UCA 1953. This section has ref-
erence to the rights of individuals to bring private 
actions in case persons violate the zoning ordinance if 
10 
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they are not satisfied with enforcement by constituted 
authority. The section specifically authorizes the requi-
site owners to . . . 
'' ... institute injunction, mandamus, abate-
ment or any other appropriate action or actions, 
proceeding or proceedings to prevent, enjoin, 
abate or remove such unlawful erection, construC-
tion, reconstruction, alteration, maintenance or 
use." 
Because of the abbreviated state of the record below, 
of which these interveners were not a part, and could not 
under the circumstances obviate, the trial record does 
not disclose the exact 1 ocation of intervener's lands, 
homes and interests. Some of the interveners live within 
the district and have lands immediately therein. Others 
are located within 3 or more blocks of the respondent's 
tract. Certainly under the provisions of 17-27-23 the 
interveners thus have a second statutory status which 
''confers an unconditional right to intervene." If we or 
any of us may bring collateral proceedings in the use of 
the extraordinary writs above enumerated, then we have 
the right to intervene. 
We will delay citing case authority until all of the 
provisions of Rule 24 have been discussed. Our case 
research brings excellent authority to light covering all 
points of Rule 24. 
(C) THE REPRESENTATION OF INTER-
VENER'S INTERESTS, BY THE EXISTING 
PARTIES DEFENDANT WAS AND IS INADE-
QUATE. 
11 
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We are loathe to elaborate this matter for obvious 
reasons, but intervener's statutory right under the rule 
compels reference to the record of inadequacy. There 
can be no doubt but that the county substantially default-
ed below. Any reasons for such are not stated in the 
record. At page 15 of the record, under the statement 
of "appearances" the following text appears: 
"For the plaintiff Calvin Rampton 
For the defendants (Ollie McCulloch physically 
present but not formally appearing." 
Mr. Rampton proceeded to make his record, calling 
Miss McNeal, Clerk of the Board of County Commis-
sioners, who brought to court certain, but not all of the 
proceedings and records, presented at the public hearing. 
In identifying the first exhibit, the following appears at 
page 16 of the record: 
"Q. I offer Exhibit 1 in evidence. 
THE COURT: Any objection, Mr. McCul-
loch? Or are you here? 
~1:R. McCULLOCH : I am officially not here, 
your honor. 
THE COURT: I see. Well, we will let the 
record show that you are physically here. 
Whether you are appearing or not is up to 
you and the Exhibit will be received. 
Three exhibits then came in without objection, where-
upon the following appears: 
''Q. Now, Miss McNeil, there were some addi-
tional Exhibits in the form of maps and so 
forth? 
12 
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A. Yes. 
Q. That you say have been taken back. I don't 
know that they are material and so I won't 
press the point of getting them in evi-
d " ence .... 
A reading of the transcript (exhibit 3) will show that 
the maps became the basis of much of the testimony of 
all parties. Brockbank predicted his testimony thereon, 
(Tr 7) as did these interveners, as where one of counsel 
pointed to one of them as being colored in purple, The 
Hi-Land-Nielson tracts, Mr. Rampton specifically re-
questing opposing counsel to make the location clear. 
The Hi-Land-Nielson tracts referred to on the maps, had 
they been before the court below, and this court now, 
would be seen to be but three blocks from the tract of 
plaintiff-respondent. Of course the numerous "maps and 
so forth" were and are highly material. They constitute 
the basis upon which the county commissioners later re-
jected the application of plaintiff to zone additional com-
mercial lands. It is clear in the record that those maps 
proved that there was in excess of "one hunderd sixty-
seven acres'' of land zoned commercially in the immediate 
area under consideration, (Tr. 36) and a great deal more 
close by. The burden of intervener's case before the 
county commission was to this very point, by use of ad-
equate and pertinent maps. (Tr. 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 40, 46, 
47, 51, 5~ 53, 56, 57, 66) 
It is to be deeply regreted that the trial court below 
did not have access to those maps; for only with and by 
reference to them, could the court attempt to understand 
13 
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the transcript, and approach the question under attack, 
as well as see the many and varied locations of the sev-
eral parcels of land zoned commerical in the area. 
Under the point at present issue, we comment only 
on the inadequacy of representation. The County Attor-
ney did not represent the opponents on the record, nor 
these interveners, when he did not call for, or make an 
attempt, to produce those valuable, important and cru-
cial maps. The trial court needed them. Its disposition 
might have been altogether different had the proceeding 
not turned into an ex-parte default committed in the dark, 
without public notice, and without the official voice of 
protest, objection, cross-examination for whatever it 
might have been worth. 
Nor is this the end : 
Later, after the ex-parte record was made, and the 
counsel of record were fighting in briefs, the subject of 
"motives" came into focus, and is the subject of argu-
ment. 
In its Findings of Fact, number 11 (a) the court 
says: 
"The denial was based wholly upon the prem-
ise that such a denial would protect an economic 
advantage already obtained by owners of other 
land zoned commercially in the general marketing 
area in which the land in question is located." (R. 
28) 
It is interesting to search for the evidence to warrant 
such a strange fmding. There are only two places to look: 
14 
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1. The reasons assigned by the commission in its of-
ficial action are contained in exhibit 1 at the bottom 
thereof: 
''Basis of action: there is sufficient commer-
cial zoning in the area; not warranted at this 
time." 
It is submitted that this is a good, sufficient and valid 
reason for such action, based on the statutory powers 
found in the general zoning laws of Utah. If counsel pre-
dicates his argument that ''the denial was based wholly" 
upon this language, he is clearly in error. We believe that 
no court would overturn a legislative body for giving such 
a reason for its use of discretionary legislative power. 
Counsel for appellant has adequately treated this subject. 
2. The real but ephemeral basis for the above finding 
by the lower court is the following leading question by 
Mr. Rampton of Miss MeN eal: 
"Q. Is it, or is it not, true that Commissioner Can-
non said the reason that he was voting against 
it was because of its impact on other commer-
cial zones in the area 1" . ... 
"Q. Is that substantially what he said~ 
A. Substantially, yes." (R. 18,19) 
Q. I think that is all. .. " whereupon the record 
closes. 
Clearly this testimony was inadmissible: it was lead-
ing and suggestive. ·Counsel did not ask her to state what 
was said. He phrased it to suit his purpose. By this time 
he knew that the county attorneys present in body only 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
would not object, and they did not! It should have also 
been resisted for the reason of hearsay! 
Had the matter been material and competent, and 
the proceeding adversary in nature, the able counsel for 
plaintiff would have called Mr. Cannon himself. But in 
ex-parte fashion the inadmissible came in without objec-
tion; and to add insult to injury, the trial court predicat-
ed its fundamental finding on this patently inadmissible 
shread! Fundamental Y-yes. 
Sections one and two of respondent's brief are de-
voted to testing the question of jurisdiction of the lower 
court to examine a proceeding before the county commis-
sion on claim of arbitrary abuse of discretion. Coming 
there to the conclusion that the court has such visitorial 
power, Point III of respondent's brief labors the question 
of whether or not in fact the trial court was arbitrary, 
and engaged in an abuse of sound discretion. The burden 
of his argument is stated at page 16 of respondent's brief 
as follows: 
"Commisioner Cannon, when casting his vote, 
and the other commissioners when putting down 
the basis for their action, were frank to state that 
their action was not based upon the things proper-
ly within the police power, but was based solely 
upon the question of whether or not they felt ad-
ditional zoning for commercial purposes would 
have an adverse effect upon the lands already 
zoned commercially.'' 
The court will realize that the above language is not a 
proper summary, due to the natural bias of respondent's 
counsel; but it clearly points up the importance of the 
16 
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irrelevant, incompetent, immaterial, hearsay, and leading 
language that entered the record because the issue was 
''inadequately represented," to return to the burden of 
Rule 24. And it is upon this inadmissible testimony that 
the lower court predicates its finding that the county 
commission acted solely to ''protect an economic advan-
tage already obtained by the owners of other land zoned 
commercially in the general marketing area ... " (R 28) 
The county attorney should have done something about 
this within the time allowed to alter Findings and Con-
clusions. Nothing was done to correct the record, nor to 
even try. Again we say, it is clear the intervener's rights 
were "inadequately represented" below. 
Further, we call attention to the belated answer filed 
by counsel for appellent: 
1. In paragraph 6 of the complaint, respondent false-
ly alleges: 
"There was no opposition at said hearing 
from persons residing in the vicinity of the lands 
in question. The only opposition came from the 
owners of other comerical properties located at 
various places from one-half to four miles distant 
from the lands in question." 
This allegation was never denied nor traversed in 
the answer, and it should have been. 
In paragraph 5 of the complaint, it is stated that "a 
complete investigation and consideration of the matter" 
was made by the planning commission. Complete is a 
mighty big word to go unchallenged, at least from the 
standpoint of 14 protestants who were in the dark as to 
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these allegations. This should have been denied, and 
plaintiff put to his proof by calling as witnesses those 
who made such investigation. And orderly procedure 
might suggest that such persons be subject to cross exam-
ination! Not even theoretically possible here. 
Paragraph 9 of the complaint in sub-section (c), (d) 
and (e) raise searching questions as to the manner in 
which zoning has been carried on historically in Salt Lake 
County. In view of the use of the word ''integrity" in 
17-27-7.10 U.C.A. (supplement) as to zoning maps, and 
the words "encouraging stability" as the objects of plan-
ning and zoning appearing in WOLPE v. PORETSKI, 
144 F2d 505, hereafter to be discussed, it is enlightening 
to find counsel for appellants did not traverse those im-
portant allegations. As the "inadequately" presented 
answer stands, the county has admitted as to sub-section 
(d) that "the zoning of the county has proceeded on a 
piece-meal basis wi.thout legally established standards ... 
Zoning has been established and changed solely on the 
basis of awarding or withholding economic benefits and 
advantages to or from the owners of various tracts of 
land desiring zoning according to their desires." (R 3) 
We will repent of an earlier suggestion that the finding 
of the court is not predicated on competent, admissible 
evidence. In the state of this pleading, such was not even 
necessary, when the county admitted by its virtual silence, 
such allegation; but of course the county may not be de-
faulted in such a manner. 
Rule 55( e) says: 
"No judgment by default shall be entered 
against the state of Utah or against an officer or 
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agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his 
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to 
the court. " 
Affirmation by this court of the unproven Findings and 
Conclusions, not based on evidence, and contrary to the 
evidence and law, cannot be viewed by this court as ''sat-
isfactory" and would become a woeful precedent. 
Lastly, on this point, and out of caution, interveners 
could have hoped that counsel would have included in its 
answer a blanket denial of all matters not specifically 
admitted, to the end that the burden of proof would truly 
have lain on the party challenging the action. As it is, 
and by the manner of "inadequate representation" the 
burden has shifted to the wrong party; it now rests on 
the county! Interveners feel they could aid the appellant, 
as well as defend their own statutory right of representa-
tion and status on the record. 
Again we refrain from citing authority until all of 
the criteria under Rule 24 have been discussed as rules. 
D. INTERVENERS WILL BE BOUND BY THE 
JUDGMENT. 
The second aspect of part (2) of rule 24 embraces 
the showing, on application for intervention, that the ap-
plicant "is or may be bound by a judgment in the action." 
Indeed, these interveners will be bound if this court de-
termines the matter adverse to the appellant. The crux 
of the issue if adversely decided, will be stare decisis, 
and as stated in KOZAK v. WELLS, 8th CCA, 278 F2 
104, 1960, it may well constitute an "adverse precendent 
for the interveners." 
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The novel position interveners face is this: if we are 
not permitted to intervene, then under the Declatory 
Judgements Act (78-33-11) we are not bound, for the stat-
ute expressly says that as to parties not joined that ''no 
declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not 
parties to the proceeding." This means that all or some 
of the interveners may bring mandamus, injunction, 
abatement or institute any other appropriate action in 
the event Gayland hereafter applies for a building per-
mit, or commences construction; this under 17-27-23. 
CircuityT Multiplicity? But these interveners would 
then be faced with the task of asking this court to reverse 
itself, and declare contrary to what it might resolve in 
the instant case. Certainly this court and the interveners 
would all be put in a difficult position of preserving the 
inviolate statutory rights of the interveners in the face 
of a decision that would operate against them as stare 
decisis. This problem will later be discussed under the 
excellent cases of Kozak v. Wells, and W olpe v. Poretsky, 
post, squarely in point. 
E. THE INTERVENERS HAVE BEEN AD-
VERSELY AFFECTED BY THE JUDGMENT BE-
LOW: 
Under subsection (3) of Rule 24 the third condition 
precedent to intervention states that interveners must 
show that they would ''be adversely affected" by the dis-
position of the property or subject-matter in question 
below. Certainly these interveners will be injured, and 
have been, by the unwarranted action of the trial court. 
But in considering this aspect of the case, we desire this 
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court to separate our argument into two parts : the in-
terest of the interveners, as distinguished from the public 
interest, the problem of serving the public in the area. 
At the outset, let us examine the zoning statutes to 
determine the statutory purpose of planning and zoning: 
17-27-5 shows the ultimate scope of zoning power is aim-
ed at the "harmonious development of the country" to 
the end that there shall be such attention paid to the 
"distribution of population and of the uses of land for 
urbanization, trade, industry'' as will tend to create con-
ditions favorable "to health, safety, transportation, pros-
perity ... tend to reduce wastes of physical, financial or 
human resources which result from either excessive con-
gestion or excessive scattering of population; and will 
tend toward an efficient and economical utilization, con-
servation and production of the supply of food and 
water," etc .... 
The inquiry of the county commission in this case 
concerns the amount and location of commercial zoning 
in respect to shopping centers, neighborhood and region-
al. Notice in the hearing transcript the county planner 
Mr. Johnson, said, with the approval of the chairman of 
the County Commission: 
"Perhaps it will be well to mention at this 
point any reference to a regioool shopping area 
of ten acres is certainly not a shopping center." 
(Tr 51) 
Let it be kept in mind that two schools of thought 
were at work at the hearing on the large question of 
where commercial, shopping facilities would be located, 
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to serve this fast-growing area. The president of plain-
tiff corporation stated: 
''This shows that the whole middle section of 
this area is an area that will be developed very 
materially and has no shopping facilities in it 
whatsoever, (indicating) (Tr. 11) 
The issue the county commission had to decide was 
whether to allow, in addition to the 167 acres already 
zoned commercial (Tr. 36, 43) the 10 acres proposed by 
Mr. Brockbank at the northwest intersection of 13th East 
at 5600 South. (Tr. 11 bottom) He projected a future 
population in the area to be served by commercial facili-
ties of over 48,000 people. ( Tr. 13) But that remains for 
the future. It was not, and is not yet, an actuallity. It 
is the commission that must ultimately take into account 
the ultimate needs of the area, in terms of its own ap-
praisal and esimate of the growth and facilities that 
should be available if and when that population comes 
in. Mr. Brockbank wanted to get ready to serve this 
influx of population. He wanted to serve them from his 
ten acre tract. But to do so, he had the burden of convin-
cing the county commission that his hazardous area was 
better suited than the acreage already zoned commercial, 
and which was and is in development by interveners and 
others. 
The other idea at work before the hearing, and which 
question the commission had to decide, was whether 
there should be one very large regional center, or several 
small shopping centers. It is for this reason planner 
Johnson stated the difference in the 10 acre tract from 
the "regional shopping area" on page 51 of transcript. 
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Interveners Hi-Land Dairyman's Association, together 
with Nielson and Scott had near fifty acres under plan-
ning and develop1nent 3 and 1/2 blocks to the west of 
plaintiff (Tr. 45, 40) and interveners Earl and John 
Howe and near thirty acres just across 56th South from 
the Hi-Land-Nielson property, (Tr. 33) making a total 
of 80 acres, with serious intentions of going forward. 
These lands were already zoned commercial. 
Thus there was the real problem of whether there 
should be a "regional" or several "neighborhood shop-
ping" centers, or the chaos that would bring none! 
If this court is to have any real understanding of 
the large issue before the county commission then and 
now, it must come to grips with the difference the county 
planner noted above between the small 10 acre, neighbor-
ing shopping center, and the large 80 to 100 acre ''Region-
al Shopping Center" idea. A casual interest in the subject 
will not reveal the immensity of the contrast, the phil-
osophical considerations back of the planning, and the 
financial risks attached to both. 
That the large powers of city and county commis-
sions exist to plan and zone is because of the blight that 
historically grows in residential, commercial and indus-
trial areas which do not reflect planning and zoning ad-
ministration. The vast expendures of our times for such 
activties, together with urban re-development compels 
more than superficial considerations of specific appli-
cants, litigants and land owners. It was and is to avoid 
''substandardness and stagnation or deterioration" in 
residential and commerical areas that zoning came into 
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our society. The police powers of the state enter to avoid 
these blights. The enormous powers of controlling "land 
use" set forth in the statutes allowing zoning are intended 
to substitute wise, advance planning for the historic ex-
ploitation by private interests alone. 
The meaning of the decision of the Commission is 
that the residential area, that is, the area roughly from 
33rd South to the mountains east of State Street, one 
vast partially developed residential area, has within it 
sufficient area designated for commercial uses so that 
the requirements of the people living in the area for the 
services and facilities provided in commerical areas will 
adequately and sufficiently satisfy their needs. It is basic 
in zoning that in a residential area such as this it is the 
welfare of the residents that is of primary concern to the 
zoners and not the welfare of those in the commercial 
area. In other words, the extension of the commercial 
areas will be determined entirely by the demands of the 
residential areas. The reason for this is that our exper-
ience has taught us that commerical areas are unfriendiy 
neighbors and that blight tends to spread from the com-
mercial areas, and if you are to protect your residential 
areas the commerical areas must be tightly contained 
and restricted so that there is not a surplus of such land 
because it breeds unnecessary commercial uses and fur-
ther expands the blight. 
A 1959 casebook on the "Use, Misuse, and Re-Use of 
Urban Land," edited by Chas. M. Haar, professor of law, 
Harvard University, entitled "LAND-USE PLANNING" 
opens this subject with vast illumination. As the very 
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words used in the title are constantly used within the 
Utah zoning statutes, this court ought to construe them 
carefully. That case book, after printing the excellent de-
cisions of the !Iassachusetts court on ''departures from 
zoning ordinances" in PENDERGAST v. BOARD OF 
APPEALS OF BARNSTABLE, 331 1\fass. 555, 120 NE 
2d 916, and the Connecticutt court in KUEHNE v. 
TOWN ·COUNCIL OF EAST HARTFORD, 136 Conn. 
452, 72 A.2d 474, challenged the student mind with the 
following ''problem" quotes from Stein and Bauer, 
STORE BUILDINGS AND NEIGHBORHOOD SHOP-
PING CENTERS, 1, 2-3, 13-14 (1934: and the same ap-
pears at the page 282 of said case book: 
''3. 'To plan a successful neighborhood shop-
ping center, we must first know what to plan for, 
how many stores, and what kind. Numerous pain-
staking surveys of existing conditions have been 
made for the purpose of setting up a basis for 
future planning. These have attempted to find the 
number and kinds of stores that would be needed 
by counting the number of existing stores or 
measuring the number of front feet occupied by 
existing stores and comparing that with the neigh-
boring population. All these studies serve but one 
purpose: they show us what not to do, for any 
one who looks around his own neighborhood knows 
that there are too many stores. And so we can 
only use most of these analyses of existing condi-
tions as a warning. They show why the great ma-
jority of shopkeepers make something less than 
the barest living and die off like flies before they 
even get started. They explain the long rows of 
empty stores in every neighborhood. They explain 
the enormous and expensive turnover in store 
property. They explain decreased values, empty 
lots, blighted streets and uncollected taxes ... 
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"Chaotic waste in construction of stores, in 
store operations and in cost of distribution, is not 
a necessary and unavoidable condition. It is pos-
sible by scientific analysis of the problem and by 
planned large scale construction and control to 
set up shopping centers that will fulfill the re-
quirements of the five interests concerned. 
"Any approach to scientific store planning 
must be based on one simple fact, namely, that 
any given community has a fairly definite and as-
certainable purchasing power, and the modifying 
factors - income, general character, buying hab-
its, location in relation to larger centers, etc. -
are quite capable of analysis and forecast ... 
"What is the use of developing a scientific 
method of store planning~ None whatever, if 
present methods of subdivision and chaotic de-
velopment are allowed to continue. None what-
ever, unless the complete, planned neighborhood 
is accepted as the minimum unit of development. 
No scientific store-planning method can be applied 
to speculative. method of development . ... 
"Interesting cases reflecting the traffic-gen-
erating considerations are Temmink v. Board of 
Zoning Appeals of Baltimore, 128 A2d, 256 ... " 
other cases cited." 
Plaintiff had in a real sense become a competitor 
with these named interveners and others. He had tried 
before the Planning Commission to get a full 80 acres 
zoned commercial. Failing, he reduced its size to 18 acres. 
Failing, he reduced it to ten acres. See exhibit "1 ", both 
sides, together with action by the various authorities hav-
ing jurisdiction. (See respondent's brief, p. 4.) Plaintiff 
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failed to persuade anyone for a regional size center. In 
the end, the planning commission recommended his small-
er area, but the ultimate decision was solely under the 
jurisdiction of the county co1nmission, not the planning 
group. It 'vas at the public hearing on the 10 acre appli-
cation that the problems and the solutions become evi-
dent. The county commission had for years held the re-
spondent's land reserved only for residential. Because 
of the express-way plans on 13th East, it had not allowed 
any commercial development along that right-of-way. 
(Tr. 32) It alone had the statutory authority to make any 
changes, or give additional acreage for commercial use-
age. On the issue of abuse of discretion of that authority, 
in refusing to zone the additional ten acres, along the 13th 
East Expressway, let us examine the statutory mandate 
clothing the county commission with legislative power to 
make decisions : 
Under 17-27-9: "The county planning com-
mission may, ... and upon order of the board of 
county comm~ssioners . . . shall make a zoning 
plan or plans for zoning all or any pa;rt of the 
unincorporated territory within such county ... 
for the regulation by districts or zones of the lo-
cation, heights, bulk, and size of buildings and 
other structures, percentages of lot which may be 
occupied, the size of lots, courts, and other open 
spaces, the density and distribution of population, 
the location and use of buildings and structures 
for trade, industry, residence, recreation, public 
activities or other purposes, and the uses of land 
for trade, industry, recreation or other purposes." 
The specification of the same powers, with regulations, 
are repeated in 17-27-11 by amendment in the supplement, 
27 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
with no derogation. In 17-27-7.10 the powers of enforce-
ment are stated to the end that ''integrity" shall be 
maintained in the official maps of the county, of which 
the zoning maps are a part. 
Under 17-27-12 the board of county commissioners 
is authorized to withhold a building permit in aid of these 
powers. 
Under 17-27-13 the county commission is ordered to 
establish regulations in aid of upholding this authority, 
to the end of 
"lessening of congestion . . . reducing the waste 
of excessive amounts of roads, securing safety 
from fire and other dangers, providing adequate 
light and air, classificati·on of land uses and dis-
tribution of land .development and utilization ... 
fostering the state's agricultural and other indus-
tries, and the protection of both urban and non-
urban development." 
Clearly the county commission had the sole and exclusive 
power to determine the location of commercial area and 
whether they should be large, small, regional or neighbor-
hood. And in these connections, it had knowledge of the 
planning of other municipalities, the state road commis-
sion, the state planning commission. It also knew of the 
existence of 167 variously located acres of prior com-
mercially zoned areas in the vicinity of respondent's in-
terest. How did that commission dispose of the question t 
Was it arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of its legislative 
discretion under the powers and duties of these statutes, 
to find: 
"There is sufficient commercial zoning in the 
area; not warranted at this time"~ 
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Certainly not! Not only was it 'vi thin the po,ver; it was 
the duty of the commission to act as it did. And no court 
should substitute its judgment for that of the legislating 
commission, in the absence of a clear abuse of that discre-
tion. There was no abuse of discretion. This court in 
MARSHALL vs. SALT LAKE CITY, 141 P2d 704, 149 
ALR 282 wisely held: 
"It is primarily the duty of the city to make 
the classifications. If a classification is reasonably 
doubtful, the judgment of the court will not be 
substituted for the judgment of the city ... 
"As to what restrictions and limitations 
should be imposed upon property, and what uses 
thereof should be permitted, has been by the legis-
lature, committed to the judgment and discretion 
of the governing body of the city. As long as that 
body stays within the grant, and purposes fixed 
by the legislature, the courts will not gainsay its 
judgment. (cases) No one would doubt that the 
exercise of the zoning power is definitely a legis-
lative function and activity." 
That interveners are the incidental beneficiaries of the 
use of such discretion is immaterial, so long as the result 
in tenns of public policy and administration is within the 
police power and scope of the statutory enactment. The 
commission had to decide the vexing question before it, 
and it was and is under no mandate to use "magic words" 
in the disposition. Had exhibit "1" simply said "no'' as 
the record of its action, it would be difficult to challenge, 
based on the record made at the public hearing. But its 
reasons were good and valid. Everything pointed in the 
record to 13th East being an expressway, expensively 
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designed to move traffic rapidly. To put a 10 acre Com-
mercial area thereon would or might violate the statutory 
mandate against "waste of excessive amounts of roads" 
in 17-27-11. A commercial use at these important cross-
roads might be found to increase congestion. "To pre-
vent heavy traffic from going through a residential area" 
is an expression to which zoning authority is constantly 
on guard. The consequences of allowing such is the sub-
ject of much reference in the text: "URBAN REDE-
VELOPMENT PROBLEMS AND PRACTI·CES" at 
page 6 in the note. See the warning of a witness at the 
hearing at page 60 of the hearing transcript. The courts 
presume that legislative bodies like county commissions 
regularly pursue their authority; they do not presume, 
as was done here, the abuse. The trial court is to be ex-
cused for substituting its judgment for that of the county 
commission because of the default referred to above, and 
the contracted record before it; but it must be reversed 
ultimately on the merits. 
Certainly interveners have been "adversely affected" 
by the substitution of the trial court's judgment over the 
regularly constituted Salt Lake County Commission. It 
begs the question for respondent's counsel to labor our 
position as that of simple competitors. We are citizens, 
with rights to challenge, but never to subvert. We appear-
ed before the hearing, presented our rights under notice, 
made our positions lrnown on this difficult legislative 
question. Our position was never presented as mere com-
p·etitors; the commission honored our presentations with 
their confidence, as shown by the vote. 
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The real question was not favoritism, nor the protec-
tion of any vested interest. Respondent's counsel well 
puts it on page 12 of its brief: 
"If an economic advantage is conveyed upon 
the owner of land by coincident in the course of 
the exercising of the police power for the protec-
tion of the public health, safety, moral or welfare, 
such a conferring of economic advantage does not 
invalidate the zoning regulation." 
As he quotes in LIEB'S APPEAL, 116 Atl (2) 860: "This 
is a by-product of zoning." 
The County commission concluded by apt words 
that the public interest would not warrant additional com-
mercial zoning. It announced in the press its disposition 
as shown on exhibit" 1". All of the interveners, ignorant 
of any appellate procedures, have gone to work in re-
liance on that decision. Tenants have signed leases with 
these interveners; ground has already been broken on the 
80 acres north and south of 5600 south at 9th East in pre-
paration for a giant regional center. Architectural plans 
have been bid upon by contractors looking for spring con-
struction, only to now find that in the quiet that the cer-
tainty achieved by the county commission has been over-
ruled and that Gayland has, virtually as a secret, rein-
troduced the frightening nightmare of uncertainty and 
chaos. 
Indeed these interveners have been "adversely af-
fected" as has the public interest. The fields that have 
been leveled and filled, the water-courses that have been 
moved to make way for millions of dollars of construc-
tion, must be abandoned. Contracts with builders, tenants 
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and the host of service personnel connected with these 
projects have been seriously jeojardized during the week 
in November that this appeal brought our first knowledge 
that stare decisis was unfixed. Competitive interests T 
It has always been thought that our economy in all of its 
greatness was bottomed thereon, subject to proper regu-
lation in the public interest. But even with the competi-
tion existent between Mr. Brockbank and the interven-
ers, the public interest is still paramount. And the Board 
of ·County Commissioners of Salt Lake is still charged 
with the fundamental responsibility and legislative au-
thority to decide where, how and when commercial land 
shall be made available to serve the growing population 
in Salt Lake Valley. It made that decision after a well-
fought public hearing, and after five months of careful 
reflection. There is evidence to uphold the judgment of 
that commission. No court should ever up-root such a 
legislative body in such an important and far-reaching 
decision, and above all, in a default situation where so 
many interest were unrepresented, and unaware! Indeed, 
interveners as well as the public have been seriously in-
jured. 
THE ·CASES 
In WOLPE v. PORETSKY, 144 F2d, 1944, 505 the 
U. S. District Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia, reviewed a case from below virtually "on all fours" 
with the one at bar. The decision articulates the issue of 
the right to intervene under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules, 
identical with Utah's. The zoning statutes were of the 
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same compass. The decision is dispositive of the case at 
bar. Certiorari was denied by the U. S. Supreme Court, 
65 Sup.Ct. 190. 1t has been followed in the 8th Circuit, 
post. 
The plaintiff there, being denied by the local zoning 
ordinances and authority, the right to build an apartment 
house on residentially zoned land, entered the district 
court claiming the ordinance and refusal to rezone were 
illegal, arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion. 
The trial court found such was the case, and ordered the 
zoning authority to amend its code and allow him to 
build an apartment. The zoning authority immediately 
complied, deciding not to appeal, and changed the ord-
inance classification. 
Interveners there filed an application to enter the 
case, after judgment, asking in the alternative for a new 
trial, or the status to appeal, both being denied, the court 
stating the interveners had nothing that could cause it to 
change its mind. 
On appeal, the entire proceedings were reviewed and 
reversed. All of the elements treated above by this brief 
in sub-sections (a) to (e) are well discussed by the unani-
mous court. 
The court adverts to the basic zoning law of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, stating that one of its objectives is 
"encouraging stability of districts and of land values 
therein." The Utah statute uses the word "integrity" 
among many others, at 17-27-7.10. The testimony of 
Carpenter and Webber at pages 31 and 42 of the tran-
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script shows the importance ofstability, ~ntegrity, in the 
field of uncertainty, confusion. The court said: 
"The interest of individual property owners 
in protecting the stability of districts and of land 
values therein is expressly recognized by Sect. 5-
422 of the ~Code. That section puts neighboring 
property owners, specially damaged by the viola-
tion of a zoning order, on an equal footing with the 
Corporation Counsel in the enforcement of that 
order. They are given the direct right to enjoin the 
unlawful construction of a building. Their right 
to bring that independent action is the basis of 
appellants' right to intervene in this case." 
Apposite to this is 17-27-23 UCA 1953, discussed at 
page 11 of this brief. 
The court further said: 
"It seems clear that a judgment which de-
clares a zoning order to be void would bind ad-
joining property owners to the extent of taking 
away their statutory right to an independent ae-
tion based on the order. Otherwise, adjoining 
property owners could relitigate the issues in the 
case any time the plaintiff began construction, on 
the theory that their right to bring an indepen-
dent action was not concluded by the decree. The 
practical result of such an interpretation would 
be to compel any one bringing a suit like the pre-
sent one to join all property owners 'vho n1ay con-
ceivably be damaged. We believe that the Zoning 
Commission, in the absence of intervention by ad-
joining property owners sufficiently represents 
their interests so that a decree setting aside a zon-
ing order may bind them. 
"It follows from Rule 24 (a) that appellants 
may intervene as of right in the case provided (1) 
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that the representation of their interests by the 
Zoning Commission is or may be inadequate, and 
( 2) that the application is timely. Both of the 
above requirements appear in this case. The fail-
ure of the Zoning Commission to take an appeal 
clearly indicates that its representation of the in-
terests of the interveners was inadequate. We do 
not go so far as to hold that adequate representa-
tion requires an appeal in every case. But here 
an administrative body is charged with arbitrary 
and capricious action in the face of a strong pre-
sumption that they properly performed their dut-
ies. Some of the reasons relied on by the court 
in declaring the zoning order void are more perti-
nent as arguments to influence the judgment of 
the Commission in balancing the various consider-
ations laid down by the act than they are to sup-
port a ruling that the commision's order was arbi-
trary and capricious. It is not the function of the 
courts to substitute its judgment for that of the 
Commission even for reasons which appear most 
persuasive. A suit to declare a zoning order void 
is not an appeal on the merits of the issue present-
ed to the Commission at the hearing. We do not 
pass on the merits of the court's findings or de-
cree because the evidence is not before us. We only 
indicate that there is enough in the record to show 
that in refusing to take an appeal the ·Commission 
did not adequately represent the interests of inter-
veners." 
"The application to intervene was timely. In-
tervention may be allowed after a final decree 
where it is necessary to preserve some right which 
cannot otherwise be protected. Here, at least one 
of the rights which cannot be protected without in-
tervention is the right of appeal. The court was, 
therefore, in error in denying appellants leave to 
~ntervene as a matter of right. 
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"In their motion to intervene appellants rely 
solely on Rule 24 (b) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which relates to permissive in-
tervention. However, had the intervention been 
permissive we think it would have been an abuse 
of discretion to deny it under the curcumstances 
of this case. Adjoining property owners in a suit 
to vacate a zoning order have such a vital interest 
in the result of that suit that they should be grant-
ed permission to intervene as a matter of course 
unless compelling reasons against such interven-
tion are shown. (cases) 
"When they filed their petition for interven-
tion appellants had all the rights of a party at that 
stage of the proceedings. This, of course, includes 
the right of appeal. Since thetime for appeal had 
not expired when appellant sought to intervene 
they should be made parties with the right to ap-
peal and all other rights a party might exercise at 
the time their intervention was filed. Reversed 
and remanded.'' 
When the highest court of the land refused to dis-
turb the W olpe case, and the rules, statutes and facts are 
so similar, it ought to set the precendent for disposition 
here! 
The W olpe case has been twice cited, importantly in 
KOZAK v. WELLS, 278 F.2d 104 by the 8th CCA in 1960. 
Intervention was there allowed one year after filing by 
plaintiff. Inadequacy of representation was ''""ell discuss-
ed, as is the binding effect required of intervener under 
Rule 24. The Court said: 
" ... we think that in a very real sense the 
applicants-interveners, would be bound .. and the 
result would certainly establish an adve,rse prec-
Bdent for the interveners." 
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The case also articulates principles of '~liberality 
toward third party practice" that are important here. 
Emphasis is given to the words in Rule 2~ "may be:" 
'~And if the case is close and there are any 
doubts, the 'may-be' language twice repeated in 
Rule 24 (a) (2) convinces us that they are to be 
resolved in favor of the interveners." 
TI~IEL Y INTERVENTION: The facts show these 
interveners acted promptly, once they came to knowledge 
of the action in the courts. The general subject of when 
intervention may be had is discussed in 67 CJS 997 under 
which we find SENNE v. CONLEY~ 133 P2d 381 helpful. 
The broad rule is stated in CJS supra : 
"Where there is no statutory provision as to 
the time within which application to intervene 
shall be made, a person who makes his application 
at the earliest possible opportunity has been held 
to have made it in time ... " 
In LEARY v. UNITED STATES, 224 U. S. 567, 32 
Sup. Ct. 599, Mr. Justice Holmes writes, concerning inter-
vention after four years lapse: 
''As to laches, there is no legal presumption 
that the petitioner knew of this suit and still less 
that she knew the position taken by Kellog ... " 
and the court allowed intervention. 
The first Utah case is Houston Real Estate vs. Hech-
ler, Utah, 1914, 138 P. 1159, in which plaintiff issued a 
writ of attachment and levied upon property purporting 
to be defendant's. The Intervener was denied the right 
to intervene for the purpose of establishing his ownership 
of property. The Court laid down the following rule: 
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"As we understand the purpose of the statute 
relating to intervention, it is not intended to be 
applied only where a third person may have such 
an interest in the subject of the action which 
makes him an indispensable party; but the statute 
applies where such third person at some stage of 
the proceedings before trial is shown to have an 
interest which would make him a proper party." 
This case was followed in Dayton vs. Free, Utah 
1916, 162 P. 614, where the 'Court quoted with approval 
from Coffey v. Greenfield as follows: 
''And the Code does not attempt to specify 
what or how great that interest shall be, in order 
to give a right to intervene. Any interest is suf-
fici'e.nt. The fact that the intervener may or may 
not protect that interest in some other way is not 
material. If he has an inter·est in the matter in 
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, 
he has a right to intervene." 
In the same case the ·Court quoted with approval from 
Pomeroy's Code Remedies as follows: 
"The doctrine may be expressed in the follow-
ing manner: The intervener's interest must be 
such, that if the original action had never been 
commenced, and he had first brought it as the sole 
plaintiff, he would have been entitled to recover 
in his own name to the extent at least of a part of 
the relief sought." 
The court in 1934 in the case of Commercial Block 
Realty vs. U.S.F. & G. 28 P. 2d 1081 allo,Yed intervention 
and quoted the rule as follows: 
"Before one can intervene, he must come with-
in the provision of the statute. He must have an 
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interest in the matter in litigation, in the success 
of either of the parties, or an inter.est against both. 
He can join with the plaintiff in claiming what is 
sottght by the complvant, or he can unite with the 
defendant in resisiting the claim of the plaintiff, 
or he can demand anything adversely to both the 
plaintiff and the defendant. But before he can 
do any of these, he must have an interest in the 
matter which is in litigation. His right to inter-
vene is wholly dependent upon his interest in the 
subject-matter of the litigation. The test usually 
applied to the right to intervene is whether a per-
son seeking to intervene may gain or lose by a 
direct legal oper,ation and the effect of the j~tdg­
ment. Faricy v. St. Paul Investment & Sav. Socie-
ty, 110 Minn. 311, 125 N.W. 676; Henry v. Travel-
ers' Insurance Co., supra. Do the allegations in 
the answer in intervention bring appellant within 
this class? 
In one case the question of the right to intervention 
in a mandamus action arose, State vs. Blake 1933, 20 P. 
2d 871, where intervention was allowed, and in this matter 
quoted the rule as follows: 
"It is equally well established that a perman-
ent writ of mandate will not issue when the rights 
of a third party, who is not before the court, are 
involved and where such rights may be adversely 
affected.'' 
The court in its most recent case, Stone vs. Salt Lake 
City, 356 P. 2d 631, stated that it would be proper for the 
Court to allow intervention by parties whose interest was 
identical with that of plaintiff after the Court had re-
manded the case to the District ~Court following the ap-
peal. 
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IN SUMMARY, interveners say without hesitation, 
that the conditions precedent in Rule 24 (a) are fully and 
conapletely met: 
a. Our application was timely, immediately upon 
learning of the action. 
b. We have to statutory, unconditional rights to in-
tervene. 
c. The representation of the intervener's interest, 
and that of the public, was inadequate. 
d. The interveners will be bound by the judgment, 
not technically in res adjudicata, but actually by stare 
decisus ; the net effect of a decision affirming the trial 
court will amount to their being bound. 
e. Interveners have been adversely affected. 
We submit that interveners should and must be al-
lowed intervention as of right under Rule 24 (a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
A careful reading of this court's decision in MAR-
SHALL v. SALT LAKE CITY, 141 P2, 704 will aid in 
the application of established law to the problems of re-
view in this case. 
We respectfully request this court to read: 
TIMMINK v. BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS 
128 A2d 256, 1957~ Maryland 
KUEHNE v. TOWN, EAST HARTFORD 
72 A2d 474, ~Conn. 1950 
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PENDERGAST v. BD. OF APPLS. BARNSTABLE 
120 N.E.2d 916, 1954 Mass. 
CONCLUSION 
Interveners regret the length of this brief; but we 
have tried to demonstrate that the effect of this court's 
decision can be far-reaching for evil or for good, in pre-
serving the "integrity'' of planning, and in the avoidance 
of blights that snuff out the lights of residents who seek 
the green and spacious country-side, away from the in-
cidence of commerce. 
If our new open residential areas are to be quaran-
tined from blight, screened-off from death-dealing traf-
fic, removed from the contagion of commerce, isolated 
from congestion, then the courts that set precedent for 
the occupancy of the powers of land-use and land-man-
agement must be alert to their larger prerogative in 
guarding the gardens of men's homes against incipient 
encroachment of the specifics that spawn blight. 
This case offers such an opportunity. 
December 1960 
Respectfully, 
41 
D. Howe Moffat 
Robert R. Dansie 
Paul Potter 
James P. Cowley 
Warwick C, Lamoreaux 
Attorneys for Interveners 
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APPENDIX 
In a larger sense, a statement of the case should em-
brace the philosophical suggestion that courts, the Salt 
Lake County Commission, counsel on all sides, are ma-
nipulators in the current exodus from worn-out, decadent 
cities and into the country. Whether we have the capacity 
to admit it or not, a vast evolutionary remaking of urban 
life is here at work. It is said by men wiser than the 
interveners: 
''New Towns are essential. This is because 
the existing cities cannot fit the needs of this age 
without a complete rebuilding ... one must begin 
with a clean slate and a large one . . . the sane 
policy is first to direct our energy toward building 
new and complete communities from the ground 
up: that is to say on open land outside developed 
urban areas. This we should do until such time 
as we have adequately demonstrated, by contrast, 
how unworkable and wasteful are the obsolete 
patterns of the old cities, and how completely they 
demand replacement. It is futile to attempt this 
in a small piece1neal manner." 
If we in this case approach the problems at bar with the 
old spectacles, we will be re1nembered only for our folly. 
Whether we know it or not, the redevelopment evolution, 
the "survivial value" rudiments are at work in the open 
fields and vacant lands of the Great Salt Lake 'Talley, 
where the litigants and interveners bring to focus the 
privileges for growth or sterility to those spacious acres 
in terms of the lives of citizens, children, and corpora-
tions! 
-A-
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STEIN, in his TOWARD NEW TOWNS FOR 
AMERICA, 218-226, (Rev. ed. 1957) said the above, and 
challenges with the following criteria against which we 
all act in the case at bar : 
~'The strained nerves, tension, physical dis-
abilities, declining birthrate, breakdown, and mad-
ness resulting from 'normal' urban life. Death at 
every street crossing perpetually haunting par-
ents. Sunless, insanitary, filthy, congested slums 
spreading blight throughout the towns ... 
"Buses and subways are packed tight with 
human indignity; 100 m.p.h. machines crawl snail-
like as traffic is congealed ... Life and movement 
is imprisoned by gridiron streets forming an ar-
chaic pattern within which houses, factories, 
shops, and offices are crammed. Sunlight and 
breezes are blocked; privacy and effective work-
ing conditions are lacking . . . Man is submerged 
in the colossal, human swarm, his individuality 
overwhelmed . . . In the canyons of the city nature 
is obliterated by the hard masonry. Man is lost 
in the stony urban desert . . . In the city people 
are always going somewhere instead of doing 
things ... The growing costliness of great cities 
absorbs an ever-larger share of the incomes of in-
dividuals and municipalities ... 
"The grave faults of the obsolete urban en-
vironment inevitably lead one to seek physical 
patterns more in harmony with present-day cul-
ture. The developments described in the preceding 
chapters have been proving grounds, and partial 
demonstartions of the evolving forms of the fu-
ture, in which -
-B-
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SAFETY will take the place of danger when 
pedestrian and automobile traffic are entirely 
separated by the use of properly designed super-
blocks and specialized means of circulation 
throughout our cities. SPACIOUSNESS will ban-
ish congestion ... THE NEIGHBORHOOD, which 
will have a limited area and a central meeting 
place, will provide a setting for friendship and 
co-operative participation in common activties ... 
ECONOMY of money, time, and energy ... will 
come from ... efficient planning for use, in place 
of speculative sale ... In the distribution of indus-
try in relation to living quarters we have made 
little progress. 
"New Towns mean new plans and different 
physical arrangements, with green belts and in-
ner-block parks, neighborhoods and superblocks, 
community centers, and the separation of roads 
and walks. These modern urban forms are bound 
to replace the obsolete, socially repellent, barren 
real-estate gamblers' checkerboard. .. 
"A new technique is required ... It requires 
another kind of legislative background and dif-
ferent ownership or control - at least control of 
land if not of building ... 
The OBJECTIVE of New Towns is funda-
mentally social rather than commercial. Bluntly, 
the distinction is that between building for people 
or building for profit ... " 
That the above quotations are pertinent, and within 
the statement of this case, should be apparent from their 
inclusion in the 1959 La'v School Case Book LAND-lTSE 
PLANNING by Charles l\I. Haar, professor of Law at 
-C-
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Harvard University. (page 56). Indeed, the facts before 
this court evolve from the current buliding of what must 
be termed ne"" cities within Salt Lake County. The im-
pact of locating shopping facilities within or near-by vast 
n~w housing districts is the compass this court uses. 
Whether it is cognizant of the amplitude of its decision 
in terms of contemporary concepts of the new planning, 
or whether it makes resort to the old norms we do not 
know. Interveners try here to elaborate the problem in 
the larger ambit of what is good for people, not individ-
ual self-interest. That the owners of commerical property 
may benefit by the legislative determination of the loca-
tion of shopping facilities, in relation to where people 
live, must be ancillary, never primary. 
In elaborating our self-interest, we yet challenge the 
court to view the problem for what it is. We are all a 
part of the current exodus. In the not-too-distant-future, 
Salt Lake Valley will be filled in with growth. Shall it 
take the form of planning, on high-principles of the gen-
eral welfare, or shall predatory interest, intent on the 
quick profit, retain the assendency? 
This is the question. 
-D-
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